This article focuses on foreign policy during the Premierships of Gordon Brown and David Cameron, with a particular emphasis on the legacy bequeathed by Tony Blair. It is often assumed that the foreign policy landscape was fundamentally altered by Blair, and that his successors have followed his path, due perhaps to a lack of other options. The article will argue that the Blair doctrine of Liberal interventionism and the emphasis placed on the ethical dimensions to foreign policy was largely a marketing exercise and changed very little in practical terms. The article will consider Blair s approach to foreign policy before assessing whether his successors have genuinely pursued an ethically driven foreign policy or whether they have simply justified their actions in ethical terms while continuing a more pragmatic self-interested foreign policy. Did they learn the lessons of Blair or have they simply been forced to clear up the mess he left behind? Overall, this article will argue that the pragmatic style of foreign policy making which existed before Blair continued during his time as Prime Minister and has subsequently been adopted by his successors, with any changes in foreign policy being largely presentational rather than representing any type of meaningful change.
some small successes in government, in foreign policy terms, the Conservatives dominated.
The Conservative Party and their foreign secretary William Hague, before his replacement by Phillip Hammond in July 2014, dominated this policy field. The Conservative manifesto of 2010 very much presaged the direction of policy that was to happen under Cameron and Hague. Liberal Conservatism, the term which both Cameron and Hague used to describe their approach appears to have been at least partially a response to 'liberal interventionism', Blair's ideology in foreign policy, which he so successfully outlined in his Chicago speech in 1999.
This leads us to the question of what has been the immediate legacy of Blair's Liberal
Interventionism? Are Blair's successors inevitably more limited in their options than Blair was? Was 'Liberal Interventionism' a real change within foreign policy making, and if it was, did it survive the end of New Labour in government and beyond? This article will briefly examine the doctrine of Liberal Interventionism and will argue that Liberal Interventionism was, in practice, largely a continuation of the pragmatic policy making that already existed in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. However, the extent of Blair's foreign policy actions, and the public backlash over the war in Iraq, limited the actions of his successors and actually encouraged new norms within the policy field, such as the necessity of a UN mandate for war, which had been beneficial before but not necessarily mandatory, and the early steps of a process which enabled the House of Commons to have a vote on military action, a process which did not exist prior to Blair's Iraq war vote. This article will argue that both Brown and Cameron learnt many of the lessons of the Blair era in foreign policy terms, but that the degree of change in the direction of foreign policy should not be exaggerated. While the balance sheet is not always positive, the collective memory of particularly the Iraq war, but also the closeness of the Anglo-American relationship, forced both Brown and Cameron to deal with international issues in new ways, some of which were not to their liking. For Cameron especially, his power was somewhat reduced by the precedent which Blair had set on the House of Commons voting on military action. As discussed below, this procedural change was solidified by Cameron after being initially utilised by Blair for his own domestic purposes, and resulted in defeat over action in Syria, a worrying defeat for a Prime Minister. However, while some limited policy changes are evident, continuities can also be identified. William Hague suggested that the 1997 road to Damascus style vision of the Labour Party, which led to an emphasis on the 'ethical dimensions to foreign policy', was perhaps not a true reflection of foreign policy making over the period. Instead, he argued that very little had changed in real terms in foreign policy over the period of the Blair government for either the Labour or Conservative parties, describing the traditional approach of the Conservative Party as 'enlightened self-interest', implying that this approach was continuing under Cameron's leadership. 'It is not in our character to have a foreign policy without a conscience: to be idle or uninterested while others starve or murder each other in their millions is not for us ' (2009) . Hague was clearly arguing that, despite the rhetoric of the Labour government, foreign policy had traditionally not been solely focus on British interests, something which had continued under the Blair government and would be likely to continue in the future under a Conservative government. In this area, Hague argued 'New' Labour were not so new.
That Troublesome Ethical Dimension
In the run up to the general election of May 1997 there was little public discussion of foreign policy, with the obvious exception of Britain's relationship with the EU, the perennial weeping wound. In the 1997 election manifesto, the Labour Party briefly discussed at the end of the manifesto how they would give Britain a leadership role within the EU, their policy on the Single Currency, Britain's role in NATO, global environmental responsibility, arms control and human rights (Labour Party manifesto, 1997) . The policies were, as foreign policy often is during general elections, secondary considerations to the domestic policies being put forward. Less than two weeks after taking office, the Guardian reported on a speech which Robin Cook had given which outlined his 'mission statement'. In that now famous speech he argued that:
The Labour Government does not accept that political values can be left behind when we check in our passports to travel on diplomatic business. Our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support the demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves.
The Labour Government will put human rights at the heart of our foreign policy… (Guardian, (Brown, 2001, 30) .
This indicates that an ethical dimension cannot simply exist in one area of foreign policy, but has to exist across all areas, but what are the measures? Concise definitions are not easy to come by, often bound up with normative thinking and linked to human rights, but beyond that there is little clarity. Chandler argues that 'there is a general consensus that western government policy-makers have, in the last decade, explicitly taken on board normative and ethical concerns, shifting away from a 'realist' approach in which a more narrowly conceived national interest was the basis of policy-making' (Chandler, 2003, 296 ).
On a more personal level, Jamie Gaskarth asked numerous former Foreign Secretaries for their views on 'ethical foreign policy' and the answers were varied and not favourable. As
Gaskarth noted 'it would appear that the idea of "ethical" foreign policy is considered a natural part of the traditional practice of foreign policy -with Cook and Blair's suggestion that they were creating something new or innovative dismissed as "illusion" or exaggeration (Gaskarth, 2012, 197 ' (2002, 120) . This demonstrates a different emphasis to the stressing of ethical dimensions and human rights earlier in his premiership.
Liberal interventionism -The Blair Legacy
Blair's 1999 speech in Chicago, often referred to as the 'Doctrine of the International Community' outlined the six principles which Blair indicated would inform British foreign policy in the future and highlighted the centrality of the Prime Minister in foreign policy decision making. Blair outlined five key questions when considering intervention in another sovereign nation. These were not 'absolute tests. But they are the kind of issues we need to think about in deciding in the future when and whether we will intervene' (PBS online, 1999). In the speech, he outlined a form of interventionism based largely upon human rights and the protection of those who would struggle to protect themselves. As Blair explicitly stated 'acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter' (PBS online, 1999 (Ralph, 2011, 306) . This is undoubtedly true, as Blair offered far more detail in his speech on Liberal Interventionism than was ever available in relation to Cook's short-lived 'ethical dimensions' approach. However, the key questions, which Blair outlined as important to answer before taking action, were not universally accepted and have been criticised for leaving important issues out. For example, Ralph has argued that it was concerning that there was no consideration of whether the case for war could be justified to others, whether they be other countries, other leaders or other Iraq war showed continuity with the foreign policy norm, while the military action in Kosovo was the exceptional conflict; a largely 'ethical' war amidst an otherwise 'realist' policy programme. As early as 1998 Blair was already adopting a more realist approach in his dealings with Iraq. Clearly ethical dimensions and human rights were not the primary driving force of British foreign policy, even before the events of 9/11, and such a flimsy application of them suggests a lack of real commitment.
The Brown Government
There has long been an assumption that during the years of Blair's premiership he strode the world stage, while his de facto deputy, Gordon Brown, limited himself to domestic policy.
However, as Chancellor, Brown had a very wide ranging role within government. Not only was he essentially second in command, but any funding decisions, whether they be foreign or domestic would need to be put to him, and his reputation as a micromanager suggests that he took a very personal interest in the economic minutia of policy. Brown was an ambitious man, becoming increasingly desperate for his boss to vacate his seat in his favour, so it seems unlikely he excluded himself from foreign policy entirely. As Seldon and Lodge noted:
Brown was determined to show that he, not Blair, was effectively in charge of the government. If he did not win every new battle against Blair, he descended into a terrible rage. The Treasury was effectively run by a small cabal from the Chancellor's office, consisting of Brown, Balls and a tight group of officials and aids, including Whelan and Ed Miliband (2011, xx) .
A more nuanced approach would suggest that while Blair was front and centre in the decision making and planning of foreign policy, his second in command needed to be brought along and support his decisions. As Whitman notes 'Brown was complicit in the key foreign policy decisions of Blair's tenure as Prime Minister' (Whitman, 2010, 836 (Cook, 2003, 320 but it was weather he had helped to create.
Cameron and Liberal Conservatism in Opposition
During their time in opposition, the Conservative leadership followed Blair's lead in announcing their own doctrine, labelled 'Liberal Conservatism'. Liberal Conservatism was a term coined by the party and utilised in a number of policy areas, including foreign policy.
Cameron argued that liberalism and conservatism could co-exist. He stated that:
I am a Liberal Conservative. Liberal, because I believe in the freedom of individuals to pursue their own happiness, with the minimum of interference from government. Sceptical of the state, trusting people to make the most of their lives, confident about the possibilities of the future -this is liberalism.
And Conservative, because I believe that we're all in this together -that there is a historical understanding between past, present and future generations, and that we have a social responsibility to play an active part in the community we live in (Cameron, 2007) .
Liberal Conservatism in terms of foreign policy consisted of five principles, not an ideology as such, but more a set of issues which were important to consider. Dodds and Elden argue that Liberal Conservatism 'seeks to distance itself from traditional conservative policies' while also tempering 'the more aggressive neo-conservatism of the Bush administration' (2008, . While the principles of Liberal Conservatism shared certain similarities with
Blair's Liberal Interventionism, the five principles, as outlined below, clearly reflected the fallout from the Iraq war and the public unpopularity and condemnation of the motivations for war. The five principles were:
 That we should understand fully the threat we face;
 That democracy cannot quickly be imposed from outside;
 That our strategy needs to go far beyond military action;
 That we need a new multilateralism to tackle the new global challenges we face;
 That we must strive to act with moral authority (Guardian, 11 th September 2006) .
They also recognised the long-term commitment which was needed in countries which had had their governing infrastructure removed in order to allow home-grown democracy the space and time to develop, as reflected in point number two. The legacy of Blair, and the international arena in which he operated, in the creation of these principles cannot be under- To that, we could also add that Conservative governments also tended to seek UN authority to take action, as seen by resolution 502 issued before the Falklands War, although whether those UN resolutions covered all possibilities of conflict is rather more contested.
The Cameron Doctrine -The Coalition Government
The 2010 election failed to produce a majority government and the Conservatives were forced to enter government with the Liberal Democrats. Historically, in terms of foreign policy, a certain degree of continuity between the main political parties has been assumed.
However, governments are buffeted by global events, meaning that for all their rhetoric and determination, they may find themselves in unfamiliar and uncomfortable territory.
Internally, changing personnel at the FCO and in Number 10 can have a big effect on foreign policy aims and the level of preoccupation on foreign policy often changes from Prime Minister to Prime Minister. As Vickers explains 'to argue that foreign policy basically stays the same, regardless of which party is in power, is overly deterministic … Actors within the state can have an impact on foreign policy' (Vickers, 2011, 9) . It is important for governments of any political persuasion to be able to read the international weather, and that is often dependent on the actions of their predecessors. What is clear is that many of the policy aims the Conservatives supported in opposition were, unsurprisingly, taken into government, such as their commitments to maintaining the AngloAmerican relationship, continuing the 0.7% development funding threshold and opposing the use of torture overseas. Continuity was perhaps to be expected in this policy area, especially on some of the larger, longer-term issues, such as the Anglo-American relationship, a touchstone for both Britain and the Conservative party. Beech has pointed out that many of the old stalwart foreign policies of the Conservative party have continued to be dominant in the Cameron government:
Given their lack of affinity for the European Union -a supranational, intergovernmental, political, economic and diplomatic power bloc -they are compelled to steer Britain into the sphere of influence of the US. This is why NATO is repeatedly mentioned and why Conservatives in the post-Thatcher era equate 'Atlanticism' and the 'special relationship' with a Conservative reading of British diplomatic history and, more broadly, with a Conservative assessment of Britain's national interest (2011, .
While there has been a cooling of the Anglo-American relationship during the CameronObama years, Britain remains one of the US's most stalwart allies and the 'special relationship' shows few signs of decreasing in significance for the UK.
Beech continues by arguing that in addition to these traditional themes in Conservative foreign policy making, there are additional new themes. The legacy of the Iraq war, the introduction of Liberal Interventionism and a more overtly 'ethical' dimension to foreign policy, alongside the creation of the principles of Liberal Conservatism all impacted on the party's overall approach. Thus, 'the partnership of liberal ideas with conservative ideas -of idealism and realism -seems different to the general approach to foreign affairs practised by the Thatcher-Major governments' (Beech, 2011, 358) . As outlined above, Lord Carrington and Lord Hurd would take exception to this viewpoint, but perhaps it is an issue of degree we have to consider here. As discussed above, Dodds and Eldon argue that idealism became the dominant force in foreign policy making under Blair, tempered with some realism, a wholly different form of foreign policy making to that which had gone before. In both practical and policy terms, we can see long-term continuities between the approaches of Cameron, Brown and Blair and their predecessors. British interests, be they economic, territorial or political, always come first, with other ideological interests, such as human rights, coming in a not-soclose second. Daddow argues: 'for "conservative" in "liberal conservative" read "realist"…' (Daddow, 2013, 116) . This would suggest that for the Blair, Brown and Cameron governments, the overriding approach to foreign policy making has been largely realist, with some ideological elements when these did not conflict with British self-interest; a continuation of foreign policy making under previous administrations prior to Blair. For all the fanfare over the Blair government's new approach to foreign policy making, very little substantively changed, although there were exceptions to this rule, such as the war in Kosovo in 1999.
The Action in Libya
The Arab Spring and the conflict in Libya were among the first instances where David
Cameron's foreign policy was tested, and we can observe lessons learned from the Iraq war.
Libya was considered to be an old enemy, brought into the fold of the international community by Blair in 2004. However, despite its return to the international community, (Leech and Gaskarth, 2015, 146) . However, as the Arab Spring swept across the Middle East, the position of unpopular dictators became very vulnerable. Oil-rich Libya, with its geographical proximity to the southern shores of Europe and its erratic leader, were of particular concern. With Cameron in Number 10, and Gaddafi desperate to hold onto power, it was unsurprising that Cameron's response to Gaddafi's violent attacks on the rebels was to begin pushing for a 'coalition of the willing' to begin supporting the Libyan rebels. which the action took place undoubtedly provided the action with more legitimacy, but the fact remained that numerous NATO members were again becoming embroiled in an internal issue in an oil-rich country. Libya's human rights record had been considered appalling for many years, but military action had not been forthcoming from either Britain or the US, with the focus of action being on economic sanctions. Morris points out the irony of this situation when he notes that Cameron and Hague distanced themselves from neo-Conservatism to create 'room within which to criticise Labour's highly interventionist policies, especially under Blair', before then undertaking a high-interventionist policy themselves (Morris, 2011, 340) . While Britain did not buy substantial amounts of oil from Libya, France, which took part in the bombing campaign, along with numerous other European nations, certainly did and it could be argued that their energy security was a consideration in their willingness to participate in the campaign (Leech and Gaskarth, 2015, 150) . Additionally, while Britain did not buy a great deal of Libyan oil in the run-up to the conflict (Leech and Gaskarth estimate about 4% of Libya's oil exports went directly to Britain (2015, 150) ), there was no guarantee that it would continue not to buy from the Libyans, especially if Gaddafi was removed.
Putting oil to one side, were there other reasons for taking action in Libya while failing to take action in other nations also experiencing an Arab Spring, such as Bahrain?
1 It could be argued that Libya was a perfect place for certain key NATO members, primarily the US, UK and France, to demonstrate their limited willingness to support the Arab Spring and protect human rights, while also protect their own interests. Libya's geographical location on the northern coast of Africa made it relatively easy for NATO nations to reach it from European bases. The weather conditions were suitable for bombing raids, something which had influenced the timing of the Iraq war because of fears over intense heat and sandstorms. Gaddafi was considered an erratic leader, having few friends either in the international community or in his region. Libya was a relatively easy target and military action there could provide a useful platform for the Cameron government to demonstrate their Liberal Conservatism, while building good relations with other NATO nations keen to take action, including France. However, as Daddow argues 'Cameron has been at pains to inform the watching public that Libya will not mark for him a step on the same dangerous path of democracy promotion through the use of force that characterised the post-11
September Blair era' (Daddow, 2013, 114) . British governments is fairly limited and therefore the scope for ideological foreign policy making, outside of the accept parameters of policy is unacceptable to the British public and political elites alike. That is not to say that differences between the parties do not remain:
'Cameron has been more cautious than Blair in setting down conditions for violations of the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty that might lead to a form of moral crusade that mired
Britain and the US in Iraq' (Daddow and Schnapper,2013, 333) . Ultimately, the doctrine of Liberal Conservatism can be side-lined and minimised if the decision-making might of the UN fails to support it and the impact on the domestic electoral front would be too great, creating a lack of legitimacy within this 'bounded liberalism'. 2 What a difference a decade makes.
The Lack of Action in Syria
While action in Libya might have been acceptable to some parts of the British public and other NATO nations as part of a coalition, the situation in Syria was considerably more (Zisser, 2003) . It was, therefore, not expected by the international community that the response to internal strife within Syria would be such violent repression.
As stories leaked out of Syria of extensive human rights abuses and violence authorised by the government against its own people, the Cameron government again began to take the political temperature in relation to military action. However, this time despite the human rights violations, there was considerably less appetite within the international community for action. Syria enjoys a strong relationship with Russia, which uses parts of the Syrian coastline as its warm water port and has trading links with the nation, meaning that a war with Syria would never receive the support of the UN Security Council. Additionally, it would add to already difficult relations between Russia and the Western Nations (the US, UK and France) who had already spoken out about Russia's foreign policy expansion in places like Georgia (for an example of the news reporting on these issues see Rosenberg, 2008 (Leech and Gaskarth, 2015, 147 Cameron 'felt constrained… to follow past practice, and in the process surrendered control over his own foreign policy' (Strong, 2014, 14) . After a hard-fought battle from both out: 'while the prime minister retains the legal freedom to direct the armed forces as he sees fit, in terms of practice parliament now wields a political veto over that freedom' (Strong, 2014, 14) .
Secondly, the case for war cannot simply be made in elite circles with the acquiescence of the voting public and backbench MPs being assumed. Instead, the case for war needs to be made more vocally and more widely as a lack of domestic support will not only make military action unpopular, it could actually make military action very difficult. Confidence in the ruling elite in foreign affairs has been eroded by the war in Iraq and now the case for action needs to be made much more explicitly. Hennessey argued in 2007 that 'the case for a public legal opinion is made', concluding that the case for war needed to be made to the public and that the conclusions of the Joint Intelligence Committee should be separated from the opinion of the Prime Minister (Hennessey, 2007, 347) .
Thirdly, it has highlighted the issue of whether the British public are happy for their government to take on a global role -should Britain be confining its action to only key areas in the world? Should the responsibility to defend human rights fall only to the US and the UK, or to NATO, or should that responsibility be shared more widely with other organisations and nations, such as the African Union? As was seen over the seizure of farms in Zimbabwe, in some places action by Britain or other Western nations might not necessarily be the best course of action or the most successful, and can generate accusations of neocolonialism which can be extremely damaging. Should neighbouring nations, in the case of Zimbabwe perhaps South Africa or Mozambique, take more of a central role in the resolution and protection of human rights? As Daddow notes 'the return to pragmatic essentials in British foreign policy is also being achieved through a reconceptualization of where, when and how Britain should use force to achieve its strategic objectives' (Daddow, 2013, 114 and realism rule and continuity is crucial. For those seeking more radical government reform and action, the civil service are an easy target, representing the continuity of government. The civil service are often blamed for resisting change and overpowering more radical thinking with institutional inertia. However, Blair's much discussed 'sofa style' of government suggests that any continuity we see in policy making under Blair, particularly in a policy area he took such a personal interest in, cannot necessarily be attributed to civil servants and the institutions, as these were secondary forces within the policy debate.
The political fallout from the Iraq war had substantial effects on the political elite in the UK and the policies of both the Brown and Cameron governments reflect a desire to finish the job that was started in that area but not become embroiled in another costly and controversial conflict. One of the notable elements of Cameron's plans on Libya and Syria were that they had a very clearly defined end point. As can be seen in Libya, this was not always successful but it did allow British forces to be removed from the area and an end, of sorts, to be reached. Blair, it is clear that his priorities in terms of foreign policy remained the same, and these led him to pursue policy aims that were very traditional and to use methods which were similarly fairly traditional. In the case of the Iraq war, for example, Blair protected the US-US special relationship by following the lead of the American administration into the theatre of war. In terms of the EU, for all his rhetoric and early signs of promise, Blair, when forced with a choice between the EU and the US, looked to the US for coalition rather than the cooperation of the EU.
Both Brown and Cameron have followed the traditional path of pragmatism, putting their faith in the US-UK relationship and continuing to adopt a global outlook. Brown was not forced to take military action, as there was limited cause during his three years in office. For
Cameron, when the Arab Spring erupted, causing instability in the Middle East and unsettling old political friends and rivals, he followed the pragmatic path of seeking the best possible outcome for the UK and using military action to ensure this outcome where necessary.
Cameron did follow Blair's marketing methods, selling his policy in humanitarian terms in the first instance, rather than relying on the UK public to accept a more self-interested justification.
For all the talk of 'ethical dimensions' and 'Liberal Interventionism', there was very little change in foreign policy making under the leadership of Blair, Brown and Cameron. Each has adopted their own personal style, focusing on specific areas when forced by circumstance or driven by personal interest, but their aims were largely similar. As in so many policy areas, the real change under Blair, the change which lives on now he has left Downing Street, is his marketing skills, his ability to present policy in a way which was often (although not always) more palatable for both a domestic and international audience. The war in Kosovo is often dealt with as a unique war, one which focused on ethics and the desire to minimise suffering in a country far from our own shores. It is considered unique because the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya which followed it were a return to traditional pragmatic foreign policy making, where the top priority is British interests and everything else is deemed a lower priority. That is not to say that pragmatism is an inherently bad thing, or that Britain should attempt to be the Policeman of the World. However, it is inaccurate to suggest that Britain is pursuing a higher cause in foreign policy making, or that we are inherently on the side of the weak and displaced. 
